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ABSTRACT
Difficulty algorithms are a fundamental component of Proof-
of-Work blockchains, aimed at maintaining stable block pro-
duction times by dynamically adjusting the network diffi-
culty in response to the miners’ constantly changing com-
putational power. Targeting stable block times is critical,
as this ensures consistent transaction throughput. Some
blockchains need difficulty algorithms that react quickly to
severe hash rate fluctuations. However, without careful de-
sign this could create vulnerabilities that incentivize miners
to engage in coin-hopping strategies which yield an unreli-
able system due to unstable processing of transactions.
We provide an empirical analysis of how Bitcoin Cash
exhibits cyclicality in block solve times as a consequence of
a positive feedback loop in its difficulty algorithm design.
Additionally, we examine the extent to which miners’ be-
havior contributes towards this phenomenon over time. In
response, we mathematically derive a difficulty algorithm
based on a negative exponential filter that prohibits the for-
mation of positive feedback loops and exhibits additional
desirable properties, such as history agnosticism. We com-
pare the described algorithm to that of Bitcoin Cash in a
simulated mining environment and verify that the former
would eliminate the severe oscillations in block solve times.
Lastly, we outline how this model can more generally replace
difficulty algorithms in other Proof-of-Work blockchains.
1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchains offer a decentralized mechanism for recording
data in a trustless and immutable manner. Participants en-
code the exchange of value or information in transactions
and broadcast them through a peer-to-peer network. Miners,
the backbone of the system, aggregate transactions in data
structures called blocks and append them to the blockchain.
To reach consensus over the ordering of blocks, miners par-
ticipate in a leader election process by solving a computa-
tionally intensive puzzle named Proof-of-Work (PoW). The
first miner to find a valid solution appends his block and
receives a reward for the invested computational effort. To
ensure stable transaction throughput, the difficulty of the
PoW problem is adjusted in response to changes in the min-
ers’ computational power by a difficulty algorithm (DA).
However, without careful design the DA can expose vul-
nerabilities, which when exploited by miners, lead to inap-
propriate difficulty levels and thus patterns of instability in
the transaction throughput. In general, this issue arises in
blockchains that lack a consistent amount of computational
power due to some miners directing their resources towards
other blockchains especially as profitability varies. For in-
stance, such patterns have been observed even in Bitcoin
Cash [4, 17] (BCH), the cryptocurrency with the 4th highest
market capitalization1. Its developers have announced that
fixing the high variations in block solve times is one of their
main development goals for 2020 [5].
In this paper, we formally model a DA designed to stabilize
transaction throughput even in chains without consistent
computational power. To this end, we propose adjusting the
difficulty after every block using exponential smoothing, a
popular approach for time series data. To justify the specifics
of the proposed algorithmwe provide a case study2 on BCH’s
current DA and investigate inherent vulnerabilities. We dis-
cover that even economically rational (i.e. profit-seeking)
miner behavior leads to severe instabilities in transaction
throughput due to a positive feedback loop in block solve
times resulting from the design of the DA. We present de-
sirable properties of the proposed DA and show how they
remove the cyclical positive feedback mechanism. Further-
more, we demonstrate through simulations how the pro-
posed DA performs under different scenarios and compare
it to BCH’s.3 We find that the proposed DA would be an
improvement over BCH’s current DA and suggest that it
could be applicable to any PoW blockchain when configured
appropriately.
1Data obtained from: https://coinmarketcap.com. Accessed: 26-03-2020.
2The code and data we based this analysis on can be found at: https://github.
com/samwerner/DA-Analysis.
3The code base for the simulations can be found at: https://github.com/
samwerner/DA-Analysis.
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Contributions
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We conduct an empirical analysis of BCH’s current DA
and examine how the DA’s design encourages coin-
hopping behavior, which then leads to the formation
of a positive feedback loop in block solve times.
• We quantify the impact this positive feedback loop
has on the transaction throughput by measuring the
distribution of blocks in one-hour periods.
• We examine the extent to which miners adopt coin-
hopping strategies in response to changes in BCH’s
profitability.
• Wederive aDAwhich discourages coin-hopping strate-
gies and present its additional properties that limit
high variations in block solve times.
• Through simulations, we verify our claims and study
the impact of various configurable parameters, arguing
that the proposed DA can be customized to meet the
requirements of other blockchains.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce readers to the core workings
of Bitcoin (BTC) [15] and Bitcoin Cash with particular focus
on forks, timestamps, and difficulty algorithms. As BCH is a
fork of BTC, the theoretical foundation and even practical
implementation of both is mostly similar. Note that when
we refer to BCH, we are referring to the Bitcoin ABC [5] full
node implementation. Unless otherwise stated, the reader
can assume any mention of Bitcoin applies to both BTC and
BCH.
2.1 Bitcoin and Mining
Each node in the Bitcoin network maintains a copy of the
blockchain, an immutable, publicly-shared distributed ledger.
A set of transactions can be added to the blockchain by
including them in a data structure referred to as a block.
Each block contains a block header which summarizes the
contents of this block and references the hash of the previous
block’s header. Miners create blocks by solving the Proof-
of-Work (PoW) puzzle: trying different values for the nonce
field of the block header, such that its SHA-256 [16] hash lies
below a specified target value. In Bitcoin, the target is a 256-
bit number encoded in the nBits field of the block header
and it has a maximum value of 0x1d00ffff (≈ 2224). The
notion of difficulty expresses the ratio of the maximum target
to the current target, D ≈ 2224target . As SHA-256 computations
produce random yet deterministic outputs, each attempt can
be modeled as a Bernoulli trial with success probability target2256 .
Therefore, the expected number of hashes that need to be
computed to mine a block at a specific difficulty D is approx.
D · 232. As attempts are independent of one another, the time
it takes to mine a block, namely the block solve time, follows
an exponential distribution with a rate parameter λ = HD ·232 ,
where H is the total hash rate of the network. The expected
solve time is then, 1λ =
D ·232
H . In Bitcoin, the desired block
solve time is 10 minutes, which is maintained by adjusting
the target depending on the current hash rate estimate; the
lower the target, the more difficult it becomes to find a PoW
solution.
The miner of a block is compensated for the invested
computational efforts with a reward of newlyminted Bitcoins
and any fees from transactions included in the block. The
block reward started at 50 Bitcoins and halves every 210 000
blocks, or approx. every 4 years (e.g. currently it is set at 6.25
Bitcoins).
2.2 Forks
In Bitcoin, the main chain refers to the chain with the most
accumulated performed work, i.e. the sum of difficulties of
the mined blocks. A fork happens when at least two blocks
reference the same past block. This may occur due to slow
network propagation of blocks when two miners find a so-
lution to the PoW at nearly the same time. As miners build
upon the block that reaches them first, the temporary fork is
likely resolved after one branch exceeds the other in terms
of work and becomes the new main chain.
Upgrades to the protocol rules can be deployed via hard
forks, whereby a permanent split in the blockchain occurs,
creating two separate coins. Some of the most prominent
Bitcoin hard forks are BCH and Bitcoin SV (BSV) [18]. Note
that both BCH and BSV kept the same PoW algorithm as
Bitcoin; hence, miners can transition at ease between them.
2.3 Block Timestamps
Each block header contains a UNIX timestamp indicating
when the block was mined. As clock synchronization is a
well-known problem in distributed networks, block times-
tamps may not necessarily be in monotonically increasing
order. To ensure the blockchain time advances, the Bitcoin
protocol requires blocks to have a timestamp greater than
the median timestamp of the previous 11 blocks, also known
as the Median Time Past (MTP). Additionally, nodes also
enact a convention by which they accept new blocks only
if their timestamp does not exceed the network adjusted
time4 by more than 2 hours. For a more in-depth analysis of
timestamps, potential attacks and improvements we direct
the reader to [6, 19, 21].
4The network adjusted time is the median timestamp of all the current times
received by a node from its peers.
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2.4 Difficulty Algorithms
A difficulty algorithm (DA) is a fundamental component of
PoW blockchains as it regulates the transaction throughput
by adjusting the hardness of generating a PoW solution. A
DA is responsible for ensuring stable block times in periods
of hash rate oscillations caused byminers joining and leaving
the network. Failing to ensure an appropriate difficulty could
result in either short time periods with many blocks being
found, or long time periods with very few blocks, which
results in a highly variable response time for blockchain
transactors.
Computing the difficulty of a block must be deterministic
and based on data from previous blocks s.t. individual nodes
can perform the computation independently and agree on
the same results. An omniscient DA with knowledge of the
real world hash rate would be able to compute the difficulty
of the next block by simply multiplying the current hash
rate with the ideal inter-block time (e.g. 10 minutes). How-
ever, in practice DAs estimate the current hash rate based
on the difficulties and solve times of previous blocks; hence,
the estimates always lag behind the actual hash rate. The
extent to which a DA is able to minimize this lag is regarded
as the responsiveness of the algorithm. Blockchains with
relatively stable hash rate, can afford to use a less responsive
DA to reduce volatility in difficulty, allowing miners to pre-
dict expected rewards over near-term time scales. Note that
the responsiveness of a DA also depends on the frequency
of when the difficulty is adjusted. Some currencies, such as
BCH adjust the difficulty after every block, whereas others
do so after some fixed number of blocks. For instance, BTC
adjusts its difficulty every 2 016 blocks, or approx. 2 weeks.
2.5 Miner Incentives
Blockchains which use the same PoW puzzle can be seen as
being PoW compatible from a miner’s perspective, i.e. min-
ers can switch between them with no additional hardware
overhead. A common way for comparing the profitability of
PoW compatible blockchains is via the Difficulty Adjusted
Reward Index (DARI) [7], which is computed as:
Ri
Di
· E, (1)
where Ri is the (expected) reward for block i ,Di the difficulty
of block i and E the exchange rate for the coin in some base
currency (e.g. USD, BTC). Recall that Ri consists of transac-
tion fees and the block reward which is constant for long
periods of time. Therefore, it can be seen that profitability is
mostly impacted by changes in difficulty or the exchange rate.
An economically rational miner aiming for short term profits,
can thus engage in a strategy called coin-hopping [10, 12, 14],
whereby the miner continuously redirects his computational
power towards the most profitable cryptocurrency. On the
other hand, long term profit-seeking miners allocate most
of their computational power to the blockchain which they
believe will have the highest valuation in the long run.
Depending on the distribution of hash rate across PoW
compatible blockchains, hash rate fluctuations induced by
coin-hopping behavior impact the blockchains to different
extents. For instance, on average 97% of the total SHA-256
hash rate is concentrated in BTC, while the remaining 3%
is distributed between BCH, BSV, and others.5 As a result,
fluctuations in the distribution of the total hash rate impact
BCH and BSV significantly more than BTC.
3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BCH’S DA
In this section, we provide an empirical analysis on issues
stemming from the current DA employed in BCH.
3.1 BCH’s Difficulty Algorithm
Until now, BCH has used two different difficulty adjustment
mechanisms – previously a modified version of BTC’s DA
and currently a more responsive one. To examine to what
extent the current DA has been an improvement, we will
also outline the workings of the initial DA.
3.1.1 Emergency Difficulty Algorithm. When the BTC–BCH
fork occurred on 1st August 2017, BCH kept BTC’s PoW
puzzle, while slightly adapting its DA. In BTC, the new diffi-
culty D ′ is updated every 2 016 blocks based on the previous
difficulty D, using the following formula:
D ′ = D ·max
(
min
(
2 016 ·T
TA
, 4
)
,
1
4
)
(2)
where T is the ideal inter-block time and TA is the time it
actually took to mine the last 2 016 blocks.
As miners could engage in coin-hopping strategies and
the loyal hash rate was expected to be much lower than
BTC’s, BCH developers foresaw that a scenario such as the
one described in the last paragraph of Section 2.5 would arise.
To ensure stable block throughput during large effluxes of
hash rate, BCH resorted to the Emergency Difficulty Algo-
rithm (EDA), whereby the difficulty would drop by 20% if the
difference between 6 successive block timestamps exceeded
12 hours [1]. Therefore, BCH’s first DA was a combination of
BTC’s DA and the EDA. However, it soon became apparent
that this difficulty adjustment mechanism did not fulfill its
objective. Miners would stop mining BCH in order to cause
consecutive 20% drops in the difficulty, which only adjusted
back upwards every 2 016 blocks. Once the difficulty was
sufficiently low, miners would switch back to mining BCH
and produce many blocks at very low difficulty until the end
of the 2 016 blocks window. As a result of this miner behavior,
from 1st August 2017 to 13th November 2017 a total of 9 947
5Data collected from https://www.fork.lol. Accessed: 2020-04-10
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Figure 1: Number of blocksmined per hour in BTC and BCH
since Amaury’s DA deployment.
more blocks were mined in BCH than in BTC (Figure 14 from
Appendix A).
3.1.2 Amaury’s Difficulty Algorithm. The combination of
the 2 016 blocks window and the EDA was replaced on 13th
November 2017 with a new DA proposed by BCH developer
Amaury Sechet. To increase responsiveness to both effluxes
and influxes of hash rate, the new DA performs difficulty
adjustments on a per-block basis.
The difficulty D of a new block is derived from the esti-
mated hash rate, Ĥ , and the ideal inter-block time, T (i.e. 10
minutes). To this end, Ĥ is computed using a simple moving
average with a sample size of approx. 144 blocks. To miti-
gate situations when the block timestamps are out-of-order,
the bounds of the sliding window over which the average
is computed are derived using the median timestamp of 3
blocks. Thus, the block at which the window starts, Bstart , is
the block with the median timestamp out of blocks 144, 145,
and 146 in the past. Similarly, the window ends at block,
Bend , with the median timestamp of the 3most recent blocks.
From these two blocks the DA computesW , the amount of
work that was performed between these two blocks, as the
sum of difficulties of all blocks in the interval [Bstart ,Bend].
The estimated hash rate is: Ĥ =W /TA, whereTA is the actual
time elapsed between Bstart and Bend , capped in the interval
from half a day to 2 days to prevent difficulty changing too
abruptly. For completeness we give the full equation for the
new difficulty:
D = Ĥ ·T =
end∑
i=start
diff(Bi )
TA
·T (3)
3.2 Oscillations in Number of Blocks
Mined per Hour
As intended, Amaury’s DA achieves a daily average solve
time of 10 minutes. This gives the superficial impression
of performing well in terms of stable throughput, however
certain patterns in the distribution of blocks within a day
emerge.
From Figure 1 it can be seen that the oscillations in number
of blocks mined per hour are notably more severe in BCH
than in BTC. Especially during the later months, it is evident
that BCH exhibited more 1 hour periods with either many
blocks mined or none. As the number of blocks mined in an
hour, K , should ideally follow a Poisson distribution with
rate parameter λ = 6 blocks, we can compute the expected
probability of mining exactly k blocks in one hour as:
P(K = k) = 6
k
e6k! (4)
We compare these ideal values with empirical results from
BCH and BTC in Figure 2. For reference, it can be seen that
in BTC the probabilities closely resemble those of a Poisson
process. In contrast, BCH shows significant deviations from
the ideal distribution during the period inwhich the EDAwas
active. After abandoning the EDA, BCH has indeed shifted
towards the Poisson distribution, but a skew on the left and
right tails remains. This is in line with the aforementioned
observations of a more unstable transaction throughput in
BCH, as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 2: The probabilities of mining exactly k blocks in a
one-hour period in BTC and BCH (pre and post EDA).
3.3 Positive Feedback Loop in Simple
Moving Averages
The observed instability in transaction throughput can be
explained by a positive feedback loop that stems from a com-
bination of two factors: the use of a simple moving average
and the miners’ economically rational behavior.
From formula (3) it is apparent that Amaury’s DA relies (in
part) on the relationship of inverse proportionality between
the time duration of the sliding windowTA and the estimated
hash rate, Ĥ . The same relationship exists between the hash
rate fluctuations and the solve times of newly mined blocks;
i.e. solve times decrease when there is an increase of hash
rate and they increase when there is a decrease. As new solve
times are added to TA, the result of these two relations is
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that Ĥ is adjusted directly proportional to the actual hash
rate change. However, the oversight of this DA is that using
a simple moving average implies solve times falling off the
window (subtracted from TA) have an equal weight in the
computation of Ĥ . Short solve times 144 blocks in the past
cause a relative increase in TA which yields a lower than
expected Ĥ . Similarly, long solve times falling off the window
imply a relative decrease inTA and therefore produce a higher
Ĥ . This influence constitutes positive feedback that results
in correlation between solve times 144 blocks apart. This
is inherently problematic since mining is supposed to be a
Poisson process where block arrivals are independent events.
The second factor that contributes towards the positive
feedback loop is the miners’ behavior as they try to maximize
profit by engaging in coin-hopping. For instance, assume
BCH experiences an increase in profitability which incen-
tivizes a group of coin-hopping minersMCH to switch their
computational power towards BCH. This causes an increase
in hash rate and consequently a series of blocks with short
solve times. As the difficulty adjusts upwards, BCH’s prof-
itability drops causingMCH to direct their hash rate towards
more profitable chains. While the hash rate drops to its orig-
inal value, the difficulty is now too high for the network, so
a series of blocks with long solve times is produced.
This phenomenon of short solve times followed by long
solve times is not intrinsically problematic, however, due to
the positive feedback found in Amaury’s DA this pattern
repeats continuously resulting in a positive feedback loop.
This phenomenon has also been examined by [20, 22, 23].
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Figure 3: The autocorrelation in number of blocksmined per
hour in BCH and BTC since Amaury’s DA was deployed.
To investigate the extent of this cyclical phenomenon in
BCH, Figure 3 compares the autocorrelation in the number
of blocks mined per hour in BTC and BCH. As mining is sup-
posed to be a memoryless process there should not exist any
significant autocorrelation which is what we see in BTC’s
graph. On the other hand, BCH has a significant positive
autocorrelation immediately after 24 lags. Furthermore, in
BCH weak positive correlation also persists after multiples
of 24 lags. As a lag in this case represents a one hour interval,
24 lags represent the same expected duration as the sliding
window of 144 blocks. Therefore, these empirical findings
are in line with the positive feedback loop described.
3.4 Coin-hopping Incentives
Given the aforementioned issues related to difficulty adjust-
ments, we attempt to assess the extent to which miners are
incentivized to engage in coin-hopping and therefore con-
tribute towards the formation of the positive feedback loop.
3.4.1 Deserts and Spikes. For the purposes of this analysis
we define a desert, as a one hour interval during which at
most 1 block is mined and a spike as a one hour interval
during which 12 or more blocks are mined. Note, we have
chosen these thresholds s.t. their probabilities are small and
relatively comparable. Building on equation (4), we compute
the probabilities of mining at most k blocks per hour:
P(K ≤ k) =
k∑
i=0
P(K = i) (5)
Hence, we expect deserts and spikes to occur with a prob-
ability of P(K ≤ 1) = 1.74% and 1 − P(K ≤ 11) = 2.01%,
respectively. We refer to a period which is neither a spike
nor a desert as a normal period with P(1 < K ≤ 11) = 96.25%.
From Figure 4 it becomes apparent that not only are the
expected likelihoods of deserts and spikes not achieved, but
that the situation appears to be aggravating over time. For in-
stance, over the last 6months of the examined period, deserts
and spikes occurred 13.5% and 12.7% of the time, respectively.
By contrast, in BTC the respective percentages are 1.6% and
2.2%, which are significantly closer to the expected values.
Figure 4: The number of one hour intervals classified as
spikes, deserts, and normal periods in BCH.
3.4.2 Mining Profitability Comparison. We examine differ-
ences in the mining profitability of BCH and BTC by com-
paring the ratio of their DARIs (i.e. BCH DARI over BTC
DARI) in Figure 5. In the long term, mining either coin is
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equally profitable as the average DARI ratio has a value of
1.0266. However, as the ratio frequently oscillates this incen-
tivizes miners to adopt a coin-hopping strategy. Notably, in
the latter months, the oscillations become significantly more
frequent and consistently reaching deviations of 10% and
even 15% either in favor of BCH or BTC. These fluctuations
are reflected in an increased number of spikes and deserts
during the same period as can be seen in Figure 4.
Figure 5: The minute average DARI ratio of BCH to BTC.
Equal profitability is shown by the black line.
3.4.3 Miner Analysis. In order to examine the extent to
whichminers benefit frommining BCH, we analyze the block
distribution for a set of high hash rate miners between 11th
September 2019 and 11th March 2020. We deem this period
relevant as the number of spikes and deserts is considerably
higher than before.
In Table 1, we give data for the five largest BCH mining
pools6 (BTC.TOP, Antpool, BTC.com, ViaBTC, Huobi Pool)
and three large miners without known identities, sorted
by their respective shares of total blocks mined during the
examined period.
% of Total Blocks Mined in:
Miner Normal Spikes Deserts Total
BTC.TOP 8.95 8.28 0.12 17.35
Antpool 8.40 1.84 0.29 10.53
qp4ajq. . . 2.36 6.76 0.00 9.12
BTC.com 6.80 1.18 0.31 8.29
qqq9v3. . . 2.21 5.36 0.00 7.57
ViaBTC 5.91 1.18 0.29 7.38
qzkuv6. . . 2.77 2.39 0.00 5.16
Huobi Pool 2.47 0.73 0.06 3.26
Table 1: Proportion of blocks mined by large miners during
normal, spike and desert periods between block numbers
599798 and 625989.
6A mining pool allows multiple miners to combine their computational
efforts and share the rewards. A pool can be seen as a single miner entity.
Interestingly, out of the five largest mining pools, only
BTC.TOP mined a similar amount of blocks during spikes
and normal periods, while the remaining four pools mined on
average 4.66% less blocks during spikes. This indicates that
BTC.TOP is the only pool that successfully engages in coin-
hopping by mining with higher hash rate during periods of
lower difficulty. The other pools lose part of their block share
to the coin-hopping miners. For instance, miners qp4ajq and
qqq9v3 obtained the third and fifth highest shares of blocks,
while mining more than 70% of their blocks during spikes7
and, perhaps rather impressively, none during deserts.
The extent of such coin-hopping behavior can also be mea-
sured by analyzing the fluctuation in BCH’s hash rate. The
logarithmic scale chart from Figure 6 shows the hash rates
of BTC and BCH over the last 6 months, estimted using a
moving average of 6 blocks. While BTC’s hash rate consis-
tently oscillates from approx. 90 to 180 Exahashes per second,
BCH’s hash rate fluctuates from approx. 2 to 18 Exahashes
per second. This means that BCH experiences periods when
the hash rate increases even 9 times relatively to the baseline
hash rate, which is inline with the results of Table 1.
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Figure 6: Estimated hash rates of BTC and BCH using a 6
block average.
4 NEGATIVE EXPONENTIAL FILTER
DIFFICULTY ALGORITHM
In this section, we mathematically derive a DA based on a
negative exponential, low-pass filter. Although the initial
formula may seem rather complicated, we can reduce it to
a surprisingly elegant form which reveals several desirable
properties, such as the lack of positive feedback.
To simplify mathematical computations and explanations
we abstract the implementation details of the PoW target
and mining difficulty. We model the target as a real number
between 0 and 1 and ignore the maximum target requirement
which is merely an implementation optimization8. We refer
to the inverse of the target as difficulty and note that it
7Full address of miners from Table 1 are given in Table 2 from Appendix A.
8The maximum target was also the target of the genesis block and it was
set to match the hash rate capabilities of the first miners.
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represents the expected number of hashes that need to be
computed to obtain a valid PoW solution.
4.1 Difficulty Algorithm Requirements
DAs need to be reactive to hash rate fluctuations, especially
in the case of coins where there might be regular influxes
causing, e.g. a doubling or tripling of the overall hash rate.
To ensure the difficulty adapts swiftly, the adjustment can
be performed on a per-block basis, which is indeed the de-
sign of the current BCH algorithm. The DA we propose will
maintain this property s.t. sudden hash rate fluctuations can
be accounted for. Most DAs employ some kind of sliding
window, considering only the most recent blocks. Intuitively,
this approach is justified as the difficulty of older blocks is
mostly a measure of the less evolved technology available at
that time. However, for the reasons discussed in Section 3.3,
we are interested in avoiding the use of a sliding window
while still implementing its intention.
4.2 Mathematical Derivation
To satisfy the aforementioned requirements, we apply a nega-
tive exponential filter over all the block difficulties, weighing
them based on time and a decay factor. For example, Fig-
ure 7 shows the effect of such a filter applied to 10 000 blocks
from BCH. Notice how the more recent block difficulties are
barely affected by the filter while the blocks far in the past
will bring little contribution to the overall result. To obtain
the estimated hash rate, we compute the weighted mean of
difficulties over the full time span of the blockchain.
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Figure 7: Difficulties of 10 000 blocks are filtered with a neg-
ative exponential to obtain the weighted difficulties.
The proposed DA uses real time targeting, i.e. the difficulty
of the block that is being mined dynamically adjusts based
on the current time. Once a block is found, its timestamp
allows other miners to derive the block’s difficulty and verify
the PoW solution. To this end, we assume the algorithm
operates in an idealized setting where miners never lie about
block timestamps. We argue at length for the validity of
this assumption in Section 4.6 and also give an alternative
approach.
Throughout the remaining explanations, we make use of
the following notation:
Ĥi ← estimated hash rate for block i
Di ← difficulty of block i
ti ← time of block i
sti ← solve time of block i : sti = ti − ti−1
T ← ideal block solve time (e.g. 10 minutes)
S ← decay/smoothing factor (see Section 4.3.2)
Index i refers to the index of a block and, by convention,
index 0 refers to the block at which the new DA is deployed,
while index n refers to the height of the next block to be
appended. Thus, tn is the current time and Ĥn is the current
hash rate.
Then, the difficulty of the block currently being mined can
be computed using the ideal inter block time, T :
Dn = Ĥn ·T (6)
4.2.1 Estimating Current Hash Rate. We estimate the current
hash rate, Ĥn , by applying a popular time series averaging
technique known as exponential smoothing (or exponen-
tially weighted moving average). Ideally, we would perform
this operation over the continuous function describing the
hash rate of the network. However, the actual hash rate is
not known at any given point; hence the best we can do is
rely on sampling this function when information is available.
For instance, the difficulty Di of block i represents the ex-
pected number of hashes that were performed in the time
interval (ti−1, ti ], so we could consider that Di hashes were
computed at time ti . Essentially, this approximation allows
us to sample the hash rate at specific points in time, i.e. when
blocks are mined.
Using the aforementioned approximation we can apply
exponential smoothing to the series of block difficulties. The
weights of data points decrease exponentially based on the
formula: f (i) = e(ti−tn )/S , where S is the smoothing factor.
Given the honest timestamp assumption, the exponent is
always negative and the following ordering applies: f (i) >
f (i − 1). Therefore, block difficulties far in the past have a
lower weight compared to more recent ones. Equation (7)
computes the current hash rate by applying exponential
smoothing to the series of block difficulties.
Ĥn =
n−1∑
i=0
Die
ti−tn
S
0∫
−∞
e
x
S dx
=
1
S
n−1∑
i=0
Die
ti−tn
S (7)
We have chosen the bounds for computing the weighted
length of the time interval s.t. the reduction to S , the de-
cay factor, becomes apparent. By convention, we place the
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current time at the origin of the timeline and extend the
filter all the way to −∞. Therefore, the reduction is given in
equation (8).∫ 0
−∞
e
x
S dx = Se
x
S
0−∞ = Se 0S − Se −∞S = S (8)
4.2.2 Difficulty Computation. Using equations (6) and (7)
we obtain the formula for the difficulty of the next block:
Dn = T · Ĥn = T
S
n−1∑
i=0
Die
ti−tn
S (9)
Although it seems rather inefficient to compute a sum
over all blocks, we can apply several transformations which
will simplify the above form. Adding and subtracting tn−1
at the numerator in the exponent of e allows grouping and
distributing a common term:
Dn =
T
S
n−1∑
i=0
Die
ti−tn−1+tn−1−tn
S (10)
=
T
S
(
n−1∑
i=0
Die
ti−tn−1
S
)
e
tn−1−tn
S (11)
Notice that for the last term of the summation the ex-
ponent is simply: tn−1−tn−1S = 0. Thus, after extracting the
last term out of the summation (12) and distributing the TS
factor (13), we notice the first term can be replaced from
equation (9) obtaining a recurrent relation (15):
Dn =
T
S
(
n−2∑
i=0
Die
ti−tn−1
S + Dn−1
)
e
−stn
S (12)
=
(
T
S
n−2∑
i=0
Die
ti−tn−1
S +
T
S
Dn−1
)
e
−stn
S (13)
=
(
Dn−1 +
T
S
Dn−1
)
e
−stn
S (14)
= Dn−1
(
1 + TS
)
e
−stn
S (15)
If we unwind the recurrent relation up to D0 we obtain
equation (16). This can be simplified further by using prop-
erties of exponentials and replacing the solve time with its
extended form:
Dn = D0
(
1 + TS
)n n∏
i=1
e
−sti
S (16)
= D0
(
1 + TS
)n
e
(
n∑
i=1
−sti
)/
S
(17)
= D0
(
1 + TS
)n
e
(
n∑
i=1
ti−1−ti
)/
S
(18)
= D0
(
1 + TS
)n
e(t0−t1+t1−...−tn−1+tn−1−tn )/S (19)
= D0
(
1 + TS
)n
e
t0−tn
S (20)
Finally, we note that when T ≪ S we can approximate
1 + T /S ≈ eT /S . In fact, this is not only an approximation
but a correction needed to mitigate the bias introduced by
considering a discrete series of difficulties instead of the
continuous function of hash rate. We detail the specifics of
this correction and give a formal argument motivating its
need in Section 4.5. Applying the correction in equations (15)
and (20) we obtain the following equivalent but concise forms
of the proposed DA:
Dn = Dn−1e
T−stn
S (21)
Dn = D0e
nT+t0−tn
S (22)
Even though the two formulas are equivalent, we suggest
the use of the non-recurrent version (22) to avoid compound-
ing possible floating point errors in computing exponentials.
4.3 Interpretation
Having derived these formulas, we provide intuition on spe-
cific aspects such as the decay factor and the nature of diffi-
culty adjustments. The recurrent form (21) depends solely
on the last block’s difficulty and the current solve time, while
formula (22) relies only on the number of blocks, n, and the
current time, tn .
Equation (21) is somewhat intuitive as the new difficulty is
computed from the previous difficulty based on the current
solve time. On average, if a block is found faster than the ideal
inter block time T , this signifies that the hash rate increased,
hence the difficulty should be adjusted upwards. On the other
hand, if on averageT < stn , the difficulty should be adjusted
downwards to decrease solve times.
4.3.1 Clockwork Toy Time. Formula (22) can be interpreted
by introducing the concept of “clockwork toy time” (CTT).
We define the clockwork toy time as CTT = nT + t0, where
n is the height of the block currently being mined and t0 is
the timestamp of the block at which the DA was deployed.
Therefore the proposed DA simply computes the difficulty of
a new block by comparing the CTT with the current time. On
average, if the CTT is ahead of the actual time it signifies that
miners found more blocks than expected, so difficulty should
be increased, which is what the formula accomplishes.
If we assume a scenario in which the hash rate increases
and then remains constant it might not be immediately ap-
parent why the difficulty stabilizes. This is the case as the
current time never catches up with the CTT because tn is
a summation of solve times tending on average towards T ,
while the CTT is a summation of T , so there will always be a
lag between them. The only reason the difficulty would drop
is a decrease in hash rate, which on average would lead to
longer solve times, therefore allowing the blockchain time
to catch up with (and possibly exceed) the CTT.
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4.3.2 Smoothing Factor. The smoothing factor S is intro-
duced to impose a maximum rate of change for the difficulty.
More specifically, the difficulty can change by at most a fac-
tor of e in S/T blocks. This setting mitigates the inherently
random nature of the Poisson distributed blocks s.t. vari-
ations in individual solve times are not reflected in over-
or under-adjustments. Consequently, depending on the re-
quirements of the application, S should be chosen carefully.
Blockchains that are prone to experience large hash rate fluc-
tuations on a regular basis (e.g. BCH), should aim for smaller
values of S to obtain a more reactive DA. On the other hand,
blockchains with a relatively stable hash rate (e.g. BTC) can
choose larger values for S , which will reduce the difficulty’s
volatility. Therefore, we could make an analogy between
S and the size of the sliding window used to compute the
simple moving average in DAs. However, there is no direct
relationship between the smoothing factor of an exponential
moving average and the sample size of a simple moving av-
erage, as their operation is considerably different. Empirical
studies such as [24] suggest that in order to obtain similarly
stable difficulties the smoothing factor of an exponentially
moving average should be chosen to represent (N + 1)/2
blocks where N is the length of the sliding window used
in simple moving averages. Applying this heuristic to BCH
which has a sliding window of 144 blocks, S should be set at
approx. 12 hours.
4.4 Properties
4.4.1 History Agnosticism. We define this property to sig-
nify the fact that the distribution of blocks in a given time
period does not influence the difficulty of a block with a
certain height and timestamp. To illustrate this property we
rewrite formula (22) as follows:
Dn = D0e
nT
S e
t0−tn
S (23)
Notice that for each block the difficulty is adjusted upwards
by a constant factor of eT /S , regardless of the block’s times-
tamp. At the same time, the passing of time tn adjusts the
difficulty downwards. Therefore, the difficulty of a block be-
ing mined at time tα depends solely on tα and the number of
blocks on the respective chain. Consequently, the proposed
DA computes the same value regardless of whether all blocks
were mined a very long time in the past, in the last hour, or
equally distributed throughout the history of the chain.
4.4.2 Lack of Autocorrelation. Not only does this algorithm
avoid the use of a sliding window, but the lack of autocorrela-
tion is an emergent property entailed by history agnosticism.
Sudden influxes or effluxes of hash rate will still produce
temporary spikes or deserts, yet arguably shorter. However,
these will not create a positive feedback loop as the distribu-
tion of blocks in time has no influence on the future.
4.5 Correction
When estimating the current hash rate, Ĥn we would ideally
apply the exponential filter over the continuous function
describing the hash rate of the network. However, as the
true network hash rate is unknown, we rely on sampling this
function at specific points in time, i.e. when blocks are mined.
For block i , we consider Di hashes were computed at time
ti . In reality these hashes were performed throughout the
interval (ti−1, ti ], so a certain bias is introduced by clustering
all the hash rate towards the end of the intervals.
To mitigate this bias we will use equation (15) and replace
1 +T /S with a constant k . We will deduce the correct value
of k by expecting a correct behavior from the DA under a
theoretical scenario. Specifically, we assume the hash rate
remains constant: Hconst . We expect the difficulty to adjust
towards the ideal value Hconst ·T , oscillating within some
margin around it due to the nature of the Poisson process
that models block arrival. We take a sample of blocks fromm
to n that were mined by this constant hash rate. The average
rate of change in difficulty should be R = 1, indicating that
on average the difficulty does not change. Thus, we take
the geometric mean of ratios of consecutive difficulties from
blockm to n:
R = n−m
√
n∏
i=m+1
Di
Di−1
= n−m
√
Dm+1
Dm
Dm+2
Dm+1
. . . Dn−1Dn−2
Dn
Dn−1
=
n−m
√
Dn
Dm
=
n−m
√
D0k
ne(t0−tn )/S
D0kme(t0−tm )/S
=
n−m√
kn−me(tm−tn )/S = ke
tm−tn
(n−m)S = 1
Assuming the DA is working correctly, the average solve
time of blocks fromm to n is T so tn − tm(n −m) = T . Performing
this replacement in the previous equation we obtain k , as
follows:
ke
−T
S = 1 =⇒ k = eT /S
Therefore, the correction we have performed in the proposed
DA is indeed justified.
4.6 Real Time Targeting Consideration
In an ideal world, miners do not lie about the timestamp of
the block they are currently mining on, allowing for real
time targeting (RTT) in a DA. In practice, blockchains such
as BCH and BTC generally have honest timestamps because
miners enact the convention that blocks should not be more
than 2 hours in the future from the network adjusted time,
therefore limiting the extent of manipulation possible. Note
that this rule is applied even though it cannot be part of the
consensus protocol as blocks that are invalid at a certain
time may become valid if enough time passes.
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Assuming such a rule would continue to be enforced, the
proposed DA is susceptible to a 2 hour timestamp manipu-
lation. Not only does this amount to a very small gain, but
due to history agnosticism this only lowers the difficulty of
the dishonest block. In contrast, in BCH the same manip-
ulation would lower the difficulty for successive blocks as
well, thereby creating incentives for miners to accept the
dishonest block when there are multiple temporary forks in
competition. For these reasons, when relying on this “2 hour”
rule, we can safely apply RTT as dishonesty is discouraged.
It might be the case that the proposed DA creates incen-
tives for miners to stop enforcing the informal “2 hour” rule,
and lie endlessly. We argue this scenario is not probable for
the following reasons. Building on a dishonest block (Bi ) (i.e.
more than 2 hours in the future) implies mining towards
a difficulty that is eT /S times higher than that of the previ-
ous block (Bi−1). For this reason, a miner would only accept
this block if he is willing to perpetuate the lie even further,
thereby mitigating the increase in difficulty. As miners per-
petuate each others’ lies, the blockchain’s time advances
unnaturally while the difficulty is considerably lower than
expected. As the main chain is determined by the most accu-
mulated work, a sequence of blocks with cumulative workW
(sum of difficulties) can be replaced by a series of (potentially
fewer) blocks with cumulative workW ′ > W . Assuming
the majority of hash rate is honest, miners are not incen-
tivized to operate on a chain with dishonest timestamps as
it produces less cumulative work than the honest chain and
therefore risks being replaced. Only an attack supported by
a majority of the hash rate would be successful, but this is
no different than timestamp manipulation attacks that are
currently possible in BCH or even BTC [6, 19, 21].
As an alternative solution, to completely remove possible
issues arising from using RTT, we can replace any occur-
rence of a time ti , with the median time of the 11 blocks
preceding block i . As the MTP of 11 consecutive blocks is
guaranteed to be ordered by consensus rules, this satisfies
our requirement for monotonic time while not changing any
of the assumptions existing DAs rely on. This does incur a
delay of approx. 1 hour in estimating the current hash rate,
but the proposed DA should still produce significantly bet-
ter results than BCH’s current DA. We note that a greater
smoothing factor mitigates the drawbacks produced by the
delay in hash rate estimation. Therefore, although we believe
formulating the proposed DA using RTT is a valid alterna-
tive, the community can replace this using the MTP and
configuring an appropriate smoothing factor.
5 SIMULATION
In this section, we empirically analyze the robustness of the
Negative Exponential Filter DA by comparing it with BCH’s
current DA (described in Section 3.1.2). We perform this
analysis by simulating the evolution of a blockchain under
different scenarios of hash rate fluctuations. In particular, we
focus on mimicking the behavior of coin-hopping miners by
adjusting the total hash rate in response to changes in prof-
itability. Throughout this analysis we are mainly interested
in the metrics we have already presented in the empirical
analysis performed on BCH (see Section 3). For brevity, we
abbreviate the Negative Exponential Filter DA derived in Sec-
tion 4 with the acronym NEFDA and refer to BCH’s current
DA simply as BCH.
5.1 Setup
To simulate mining, we adjust the total hash rate to create
various relevant scenarios that a DA could be exposed to.
For simulating Amaury’s DA and the MTP variation of
NEFDA it suffices to simulate the blockchain evolution on a
per-block basis. Aswe have knowledge of the actual hash rate
we model the block solve times by using a random number
generator that produces values distributed according to an
exponential distribution with rate parameter λ = H ·T /2256,
where T /2256 represents the success probability of one hash
computation.
On the other hand, simulating NEFDA with RTT requires
a more expensive computation as we have to update the
target more frequently than at every block; we are satisfied
with a per-second precision.
Through experimentation, we found that running the sim-
ulation for 100 000 blocks, corresponding to approx. two
years of simulated time, is enough to clearly reveal any
features of the metrics we are considering. We start sim-
ulations with a hash rate of 1 Exahashes per second, i.e.
H = 1018hashes/s, to maintain the scale of BCH’s hash
rate. Aiming for an ideal inter block time of 10 minutes,
we initialize the blockchain with an appropriate target of
T = 2256/(H · 10 mins) ≈ 1.9256.
5.2 Modeling Miner Behavior
If all miners would focus on short term profit, then all the
hash rate would be directed solely towards the chain with the
highest profitability. However, in practice this scenario does
not occur as miners have socio-political beliefs and might
incur switching costs due to their mining configuration. As
we are only interested in simulatingminers’ behavior and not
the relation between specific chains, we simplify profitability
computations by only comparing the estimated DARI with its
initial value and assuming a constant exchange rate as most
SHA-256 coins are highly correlated. Thus, we assumeminers
compute DARIs as the ratio between the average target of
the last NDARI blocks and the initial target of the blockchain.
Although hash rate fluctuations appear in response to DARI
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oscillations, it remains unclear what exact switching logic
miners employ. To this end, we believe the following 3model
of miners are general enough to capture the behavior of any
real miner.
Idealistic miners allocate all their hash rate to BCH re-
gardless of how much profitability drops; they represent the
baseline hash rate HB .
Greedy coin-hopping miners allocate all their hash rate HG
towards BCH only when the DARI increases by at least 5%.
Variable coin-hopping miners allocate part of their total
hash rateHV in relation to the current profitability. Although
this relation is not clear in reality, we consider a model based
on the logistic curve. The intention is to emulate both the
initial stage when the hash rate increases exponentially as
miners realize the advantage in profitability, and the later
stage when the hash rate influx gradually slows down. The
model directs all the hash rate away from or towards BCH,
if drops or increases in profitability larger than 15%9 occur.
Otherwise, a variation x between −15% and 15% leads to a
contribution of H = Hv/(1 + e−6/0.15·x ) towards the total
hash rate.
Figure 8: The probabilities of mining exactly k blocks in a
one-hour period using NEFDA–RTT and BCH.
5.3 NEFDA–RTT vs. BCH’s DA
We start by comparing RTT-based NEFDA with BCH when
HV = HG = 4 × HB and NDARI = 6 blocks. A very brief
analysis of the average solve times: 599.97 s for NEFDA–
RTT and 604.34 s for BCH, already reveals how NEFDA–
RTT achieves a more appropriate value. Furthermore, the
probability distribution of the number of blocks per hour
produced using NEFDA–RTT and BCH are compared to the
(ideal) expected values in Figure 8. The distribution obtained
with NEFDA–RTT shows veryminor deviation from the ideal
plot, probably as a result of the extreme scenario simulated.
At the same time, BCH shows significant skew on both tails
of the distribution, suggesting that both deserts and spikes
are produced. Analyzing the per-hour block count reveals a
9We have chosen this value based on data presented in Section 3.4.2.
much larger standard deviation in BCH than in NEFDA–RTT
(see Figure 16 from Appendix A). Indeed, deserts and spikes
occurr 22.4% and 17.5% of the time when using BCH while
only 3.6% and 2.7% when using NEFDA–RTT.
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Figure 9: The autocorrelation in number of blocksmined per
hour in NEFDA–RTT (top) and BCH (bottom)
As expected, the reason for this massive discrepancy is the
positive feedback loop present in BCH. Figure 9 shows the
significant amount of positive correlation that appears atmul-
tiples ofW (the size of BCH’s sliding window). Interestingly,
BCH also shows negative correlation between blocks that
areW /2 apart, indicating that there is a delay of 12 hours in
hash rate estimation. On the other hand, NEFDA–RTT shows
negative correlation between neighboring hour-buckets in-
dicating that the DA rapidly responds to sudden hash rate
fluctuations. By adjusting the target more quickly the DARIs
oscillations are limited and miners are less incentivized to
abandon mining (see Figure 16 from Appendix A for target,
hash rate and DARI results).
5.4 Smoothing Factor Trade-offs
To examine the influence of the smoothing factor over the
performance of NEFDA, we model a slightly more extreme
environment by increasing the total hash rate of variable
miners: HV = 6 × HB . Simulations are run using NEFDA–
RTT with 3 smoothing factors that are multiples of the ideal
inter block time, in order to represent 36, 72 and 144 blocks.
An initial analysis of the average solve times: 600.0015 s for
NEFDA–36, 599.9835 s for NEFDA–72 and 599.9895 s for
NEFDA–144 shows how NEFDA in general copes much bet-
ter than BCH even in more extreme environments. However,
we do observe slight improvements in the targeting of the
ideal average of 600s as the smoothing factor is increased.
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Figure 10: The probabilities of mining exactly k blocks
in a one-hour period using various smoothing factors for
NEFDA–RTT.
Figure 10 reveals that all distributions have an appropriate
center of mass, but lower smoothing factors slightly flatten
the curve skewing the distribution from the ideal values.
These small discrepancies affect the proportion of deserts:
6.77%, 4.14%, 2.81% and spikes: 4.84%, 3.06%, 2.14% (values
are given in order for each of the smoothing factors consid-
ered: 36, 72 and 144 block). As shorter smoothing factors
attribute greater relevance to recent blocks the algorithm
risks being too reactive, and therefore over or underestimat-
ing the current network hash rate. As shown in Figure 11,
this effect translates in more volatile targets, especially when
underestimating the hash rate due to long block solve times.
In turn, this leads to more volatile profitability which encour-
ages coin-hopping behavior.
Figure 11: Comparison of the targets produced using differ-
ent smoothing factors in NEFDA.
On the other hand, greater smoothing factors are not al-
ways desirable. Figure 12 shows the evolution of targets for
each of the three variants of NEFDA when simulating a sce-
nario in which the hash rate increases exponentially without
any coin-hopping behavior. Although the lower smooth-
ing factors still imply a more volatile target, the average
solve times are now: 599.5518s for NEFDA–36, 599.1267s for
NEFDA–72 and 598.2724s for NEFDA–144, which imply that
the more reactive nature of NEFDA–36 and NEFDA–72 is
desirable under these conditions.
Figure 12: Comparison of the targets produced using dif-
ferent smoothing factors in NEFDA under exponentially in-
creasing hash rate.
5.5 Median Time Past Considerations
Lastly, we analyze the effects of using the MTP variant of
NEFDA, by simulating it under the first scenario (HV = HG =
4 ×HB and NDARI = 6 blocks.) As mentioned in Section 4.6,
the MTP of the last 11 blocks introduces a lag of approx. 1
hour in hash rate estimations. A small smoothing factor im-
plies NEFDA’s current hash rate estimate is mainly based on
the most recent blocks. Due to the lag introduced by the MTP
these recent blocks may not have their difficulties updated
accordingly and a positive feedback might be introduced in
the computation. However, unlike in BCH, where the posi-
tive feedback leads to a perpetuating loop due to the use of
equal weights and a sliding window, NEFDA’s positive feed-
back quickly diminishes as the weights of the problematic
blocks fade in time (see Figure 15 from Appendix A).
Figure 13: The probability distribution of exactly k blocks
beingmined during a one hour period using various smooth-
ing factors for NEFDA-MTP, compared to the ideal values.
This effect is reflected in skewed block distributions (see
Figure 13). Notice how higher smoothing factors mitigate
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the use of MTP. Therefore, if a community decides in favor
of MTP, we suggest assuming the costs of a less reactive DA
and selecting a smoothing factor much larger (e.g. 20 times)
than the MTP’s window size.
6 RELATEDWORK
The most extensive body of difficulty algorithm research
has been done by the pseudonym zawy12, who provides
a comprehensive overview of various difficulty algorithms
in [24]. He also examines the difficulty instabilities in BCH
in [22]. Regarding our proposed DA, zawy12 simulates the
performance of two algorithms also based on exponential
filters: ASERT [13] and EMA [25], which is an approximation
of ASERT that avoids the computation of exponentials. We
have become aware of ASERTwhich is essentially equivalent
to our proposed DA, only after receiving the unpublished
work of Mark B. Lundeberg from zawy12. Our additional
contribution consists of the mathematical derivation of this
algorithm, an outline of desirable properties, and motivation
for the correction.
In [11] the author shows how Bitcoin’s difficulty algorithm
causes shorter block solve-times in the case of an exponen-
tially hash rate growth and defines an alternative model
which achieves desired average block times in the long-run,
yet is subject to increased solve time fluctuations.
A stochastic model is presented in [8], where the difficulty
target is modeled as a random variable that is a function of
previous block times.
The difficulty adjustment problem is addressed from a
feedback control engineering perspective in [9], where the
difficulty is adjusted on a per-block basis using a non-linear
feedback controller based on amoving average filter of recent
block timestamps for ensuring stable block solve times.
Bobtail is an alternative difficulty algorithm is presented
in [2], which reduces block solve-time variance, yet comes
at the cost of requiring significantly larger block headers.
In [3] a new difficulty algorithm is presented based on
“bonded mining”, whereby a miner has to put up collateral
and commit to mine at an offered hash rate over a period of
blocks.
An investigation into the decision-making process driving
miner behavior during times of BCH’s EDA is presented
in [1].
A game theoretic framework of miners switching between
PoW-compatible blockchains based on difficulty is proposed
in [12]. The authors further show that BCH experienced a
lack of loyal miners prior to the introduction of Amaury’s
difficulty adjustment algorithm, which temporarily under-
mined the security of the system. The consequences of min-
ers switching under the current BCH DA remained unexam-
ined.
In parallel work, an explanation of how a DA based on an
exponentially weighted moving average could mitigate the
difficulty instabilities in BCH was provided by [20].
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first provide a case study on BCH’s DA and
show how the behavior of economically rational miners can
lead to severe instabilities in throughput as a consequence of
a positive feedback loop stemming from Amaury’s DA. Fur-
thermore, we analyze the extent to which miners contribute
towards sustaining the positive feedback loop in BCH’s DA
and find that some large miners were able to successfully
mine BCH only during periods of lower difficulty. The cycli-
cal pattern in block solve times skews the distribution of the
number of blocks per one-hour intervals therefore having a
negative impact over the transaction throughput. In order
to mitigate periods of undesired (either too low or too high)
throughput, we propose and model a DA, which does not
lead to the formation of a positive feedback loop and can
cope effectively with sudden hash rate fluctuations. We ex-
plain how the proposed DA exhibits desirable properties in
the form of history agnosticism and lack of any significant
autocorrelation. Additionally, we show how the modeled DA
is configurable in the level of responsiveness. Through simu-
lations, we demonstrate how the proposed DA outperforms
BCH’s current DA in terms of reducing target volatility and
in turn high variations in block solve times. Furthermore, we
show how tomitigate drawbacks introduced by theMTP vari-
ation of the Negative Exponential Filter DA, by configuring
the smoothing factor. Therefore, the modeled DA constitutes
a viable alternative for both large and small blockchains (in
terms of baseline hash rate) when configured appropriately.
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A ADDITIONAL FIGURES
Figure 14: Number of blocks mined per hour (top) and block
difficulties (bottom) for the period during which the Emer-
gency Difficulty Algorithm was active.
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Figure 15: The autocorrelation in number of blocks mined
per hour for NEFDA–MTP with smoothing factors 288, 144,
72 and 36, as well as for BCH in a coin hopping simulation
of 100 000 blocks.
Address Miner
qpk4hk3wuxe2uqtqc97n8atzrrr6r5mleczf9sur4h BTC.TOP
qqfc3lxxylme0w87c5j2wdmsqln6e844xcmsdssvzy Antpool
qrcuqadqrzp2uztjl9wn5sthepkg22majyxw4gmv6p ViaBTC
qrd9khmeg4nqag3h5gzu8vjt537pm7le85lcauzezc BTC.com
qrjc9yecwkldlhzys3euqz68f78s2wjxw5h6j9rqpq Huobi Pool
qp4ajqctqvx5m5fhpswdkgm9whwsapgst5twl9zd5h unknown
qqq9v3hhl0vga8w5cts6dx5aa8xep2v2ssvppp5xcn unknown
qzkuv6ftvt28v6hauv44r58tjupsgn3nqsnslfxzqf unknown
Table 2: The Bitcoin Cash addresses for selected miners.
Figure 16: The targets, hash rates and blocksmined per hour
for NEFDA–RTT and Amaury’s DA in a coin-hopping simu-
lation of 100 000 blocks.
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